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Abstract
We present a theoretical and experimental study of three Cheap Talk games, each having
two senders and one receiver. The communication of senders is simultaneous in the first
game, sequential in the second game and determined by the receiver in the third game
(the Choice Game). We find that the overcommunication phenomenon observed in similar
settings with only one sender becomes insignificant in our two-sender model regardless
of the mode of communication. Despite similar theoretical predictions for these games,
we observe systematic differences in experiments. In particular, while non-conflicting
messages are observed less frequently under sequential communication due to the tendency
of the second sender to revert the message of the first sender, the frequency of the second
sender being truthful when the first sender lies is considerably higher in the Sequential
Game in comparison to the truth-telling level in the Simultaneous Game. Moreover, in the
Choice Game receiver prefers simultaneous mode of communication slightly more often
than the sequential one. We explain the observed behavior of the players, estimating a logit
quantal response equilibrium model and additionally running some logistic regressions.
We find that the mode of communication is critical in design problems where a second
opinion is available.
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1 Introduction
A recent experimental literature analyzes information transmission in a class of
sender-receiver games in which the only equilibrium is a ‘babbling equilibrium’ where
communication is not informative. In this class of games, a sender privately observes
Nature’s realization of a conflicting payoff table that could be of two equally likely
types. The sender then transmits a message involving the type of the payoff table
to the receiver, whose action will in turn determine an outcome in the payoff table
chosen by Nature. The possible strategies are telling the truth and lying about the
payoff table from the viewpoint of the sender whereas trusting and distrusting from
the viewpoint of the receiver. For this class of games, it is known since the seminal
work of Crawford and Sobel (1982) that the sender will optimally not transmit any
information in any sequential equilibrium. While the comparative statics predictions
of this theory was experimentally confirmed by Dickhaut et al. (1995), a number of
experiments conducted recently offer conflicting evidence. The main experimental
findings of this recent literature (which we present in detail in Section 1.1) are the
existence and the robustness of overcommunication and overtrust phenomenon i.e.
higher truth-telling and trust levels than the theory predicts.
In this paper, we extend the baseline cheap talk model of Sa´nchez-Page´s and
Vorsatz (2007) in a direction to allow for two senders under different modes of com-
munication (simultaneous vs sequential) to identify whether the overcommunication
and overtrust persists and which mode could potentially bring more benefit to an
uninformed receiver. As the mode of communication could be relevant on the level of
information transmitted in various settings (such as getting advice from two experts,
doctors, lawyers, managers etc.), extending a one sender and one receiver model to a
multi-sender setup to identify the effects of different modes of communication could
be instrumental in mechanism design.
In that regard, we consider three different sender-receiver games played by two
senders and one receiver, namely the Simultaneous, Sequential, and Choice Game.
The informational setup in each game is similar to that in the single sender -receiver
game studied by Sa´nchez-Page´s and Vorsatz (2007). The receiver only knows the
possible payoff tables, whereas the two senders also know the actual payoff table.
Each game is a constant-sum; so the receiver and the two senders as a whole have
opposing interests. Additionally, we assume that the two senders’ payoffs are always
equal in order to isolate the effect of the order of play in the sequential communi-
cation of the senders with the receiver. In the Simultaneous Game, the two senders
simultaneously transmit a payoff-relevant message (the type of the actual payoff ta-
ble) to the receiver. In the Sequential Game, the two senders are named by sender
1 and sender 2 with respect to a given order, and then sender 1 transmits a payoff-
relevant message that is received by both sender 2 and the receiver. Next, sender 2
transmits a payoff-relevant message to the receiver. Finally, in the Choice Game, the
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receiver first decides whether the Simultaneous or Sequential Game will be played,
and then the chosen game is played accordingly. In each of these three games, the
receiver takes an action after observing the message of the senders, and consequently
the payoffs of the three players are determined by the actual payoff table chosen by
Nature and the action taken by the receiver. Since preferences of the senders and the
receiver are not aligned, the theory predicts that rational and self-interested senders
will optimally not transmit any information under any mode of communication; and
consequently the choice of the game will be immaterial for a rational receiver.
Our experiments yield the following results.
• While the excessive truth-telling phenomenon –which has been observed in
sender-receiver games that involve a single sender but otherwise have simi-
lar structures– is still somewhat persistent, it becomes insignificant with the
addition of a second sender regardless of the mode of communication of the
senders.
• In particular, senders exhibit excessive truth-telling by sending truthful mes-
sages with a frequency of 54% in the Simultaneous Game and 53.3% in the
Sequential Game, which are higher than the theoretical prediction of the one
half, but with p-values that are higher than 0.05.
• Interestingly, the frequency that sender 1 is truthful is 50% in the Sequential
Game, whereas the frequency that sender 2 is truthful given that sender 1 is
truthful is 54% and it becomes as high as 58.9% when sender 1 lies in the
Sequential Game. Thus, the main contribution to the excessive truth-telling
comes from senders playing the second move in the Sequential Game.
• Senders send non-conflicting messages 51.4% of the time in Simultaneous Game
and 46.4% in the Sequential Game. While non-conflicting messages in the
Sequential Game are more likely to be truthful than not with a frequency of
54.5%, this figure is remarkably higher in the Simultaneous Game with 58.2%.
• Excessive trust the receiver is found to exhibit in cheap talk games with a
single sender is not affected by the presence of a second sender under any type
of communication. The trust frequencies are 56.5% for the Simultaneous Game
and 59.6% for the Sequential Game, but only the latter figure is significantly
different than the theoretical prediction of 0.5.
• The expected utility of the receiver is higher in the Simultaneous Game com-
pared to the Sequential Game.
• In the Choice Game receivers prefer simultaneous messages slightly more of-
ten than sequential messages, however it is not significantly different than the
theoretical prediction.
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In order to explain the observed differences in behavior of senders and receiver in
simultaneous and sequential plays, we use a logit agent quantal response equilibrium
(logit-AQRE) model, following Peeters et al. (2013) and Gurdal et al. (2014).1
In this behavioral model, where players could be boundedly rational, each sender is
associated with a parameter representing non-monetary cost of lying. The Maximum
Likelihood Estimations of the model show that the subjects in our experiments are
indeed boundedly rational, while the magnitude of their irrationality is found to be
independent of the type of the game they play. However, while the senders in the
Simultaneous Game and sender 2 in the Sequential Game who moves after sender 1
has lied are found to face a nonzero cost of lying; this is not the case for sender 1 or
for sender 2 when sender 1 is truthful in the Sequential Game.
Our findings also reveal that in terms of the induced expected utilities the Se-
quential Game is the superior game for each of the two senders and consequently
the inferior game for the receiver. Additionally, in both of the Simultaneous and
Sequential Games the receiver becomes better off when senders submit nonconflict-
ing messages, which are observed more frequently in Simultaneous Game. These
results suggest that the choice of how players communicate may be essential for
principal-agent problems with multiple agents.
To investigate the determinants of the observed receiver behavior in the Choice
Game we run logistic regressions. Among various results, we show that the receiver is
more likely to select simultaneous play if the previous play was simultaneous and the
receiver earned the high payoff and much more likely to select simultaneous play if the
messages were nonconflicting additionally. Whether the messages are conflicting in
a sequential play does not statistically significantly affect the probability of choosing
simultaneous play the next period. The receiver is statistically significantly the
least likely to select simultaneous play if the receiver earned the high payoff in a
sequential play in the last period. Also, we find that high ratio of nonconflicting
messages in both the Simultaneous and the Sequential Game increases the likelihood
of simultaneous choice in the Choice Game, while the estimated impact is much
larger in the Simultaneous Game than in the Sequential Game.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.1 presents the related
literature. Section 2 introduces two senders and one receiver games played in the
experiments and presents some theoretical predictions. Section 3 presents the exper-
imental design and procedures, while Section 4 reports experimental results. Section
5 estimates logit quantal response equilibrium (logit-AQRE) models for the Simulta-
neous and the Sequential Game and Section 6 contains several logistic regressions to
estimate the receiver behavior in the Choice Game. Finally, Section 7 contains some
discussion and concluding remarks. (The instructions corresponding to the experi-
1The logit-AQRE model was introduced by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1998). Due to the
bounded rationality of players in this model, the best response correspondences are continuous as
in laboratory experiments.
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mental games are presented in Appendix A, and the proofs of all the propositions
are relegated to Appendix B.)
1.1 Related Literature
The theoretical literature has studied the multi-sender cheap talk games quite well.
For example, Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989), Krishna and Morgan (2001), Gick (2008),
and Li (2008) among others extend the basic one sender and one receiver model in
Crawford and Sobel (1982) by allowing two perfectly informed senders. Austen-Smith
(1990a, 1990b, 1993b) consider the case with two imperfectly informed senders while
Austen-Smith (1990b, 1993b) also analyze the effects of alternative communication
modes, namely simultaneous and sequential transmission of information. A common
feature of these extensions is that the policy space is unidimensional, while Milgrom
and Roberts (1986), Austen-Smith (1993a), Battaglini (2002, 2004), Ambrus and
Takashi (2008) and Lai et al. (2011) consider multidimensional models of cheap
talk. Very recently, a number of models in this rapidly growing literature were
also tested by game-theoretic laboratory experiments (see, for example, Minozzi and
Woon (2018); Vespa and Wilson (2012a, 2012b) among others). The main focus of
this literature has been to study the effect of different institutions on information
transmission or to find conditions which ensure that a fully-revealing equilibrium
exists. To the best of our knowledge, this literature is currently missing multi-sender
extensions of one sender and one receiver models with an essentially unique and
babbling equilibrium under different modes of communication.
The basic models of cheap talk with essentially unique babbling equilibria have
drawn attention in the experimental literature as these models enables one to clearly
distinguish between the experimental observations and theoretical predictions. For
the basic sender-receiver game, Gneezy (2005) shows that when preferences are con-
flictive but only the sender knows the structure in the possible payoff tables, the
sender is more likely to lie when her gain from lying is higher or the loss for the re-
ceiver is lower. Hurkens and Kartik (2009) control for preferences in Gneezy’s (2005)
experiment and show that the behavior of some subjects can be rationalized with
the propensity to lie. Similar results to those in Gneezy (2005) are also obtained
by Sutter (2009), using a broader definition of deception according to which the
sender can be truthful under the expectation that the receiver will not trust him.
Cai and Wang (2006) find that the truth-telling of senders and the trust of receivers
are higher than predicted by theory. In another strand of the same experimental
literature, Sa´nchez- Page´s and Vorsatz (2007) show that when conflicting prefer-
ences in a baseline game of the described class are zero-sum but not too unequal,
the subjects in the role of a sender transmit a correct message significantly more fre-
quently than theoretically expected. To study the behavioral basis of the observed
overcommunication, Sa´nchez-Page´s and Vorsatz (2007) also consider a punishment
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game in which the receiver can costly punish the sender after observing the outcome
of the baseline game. This extension shows that subjects who, in the role of the
sender, tell the truth excessively are those who, in the role of the receiver, punish
the sender frequently after any game history where they were deceived by trusting
the message of the sender. This result is more recently supported by Peeters et al
(2012), where a baseline sender-receiver game is played both under a sanction-free
institution and under a sanctioning institution, where the receiver has the option to
reduce the payoffs of both players to zero after observing the outcome of the baseline
game. An alternative behavioral explanation for excessive truth-telling is provided
by Sa´nchez-Page´s and Vorsatz (2009). Using the baseline and punishment games in
Sa´nchez-Page´s and Vorsatz (2007) with a modification that the sender in the baseline
game additionally has a costly option of remaining silent, they show that overcom-
munication in the baseline game can be attributed to lying aversion and not to a
preference for truth-telling.
Recently, a number of papers have studied the robustness of overcommunication
phenomenon to several extensions of the basic sender-receiver model. For example,
Peeters et al. (2008) considered, in addition to a baseline sender-receiver game,
a reward game permitting the receiver to give a fixed reward to the sender after
observing the outcome of the baseline game. They show that overcommunication of
the sender disappears in the presence of rewards, whereas the trust by the receiver
increases significantly. Their findings also involve that subjects that choose to reward
frequently tell the truth and trust more often than the whole population. More
recently, Gurdal et al (2014) analyzed the robustness of excessive truth-telling and
excessive trust to the intervention of a regulator, or equivalently to the presence of
non-strategic sender types. In this regulatory setup, a strategic sender is allowed to
transmit messages only with some fixed probability less than one. The experimental
findings of Gurdal et al (2014) show that excessive truth-telling and excessive trust
are higher under intervention than under the absence of intervention. In addition,
receivers earn significantly more than senders under intervention; but not so in the
absence of intervention.
In a more recent paper, Minozzi and Woon (2018) analyze the effect of having
a second sender in a sequential cheap talk game taking into account differences
in alignment of preferences of the senders and receiver and test the predictions of
Krishna and Morgan (2001). They compare the amount of information transmitted in
a two-sender sequential model and a single-sender model. They show that the receiver
gets the same amount of information –which is higher that the theoretical prediction–
with the addition of the second sender regardless of the alignment or competition
between the senders. Our model investigates a case with two-senders under different
modes of communication where essentially unique equilibria is a babbling one to
experimentally identify the effects of different modes of communication on the truth-
telling of the senders and the trust of the receiver.
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2 The Model and the Theoretical Predictions
We extend the sender-receiver game studied by Sa´nches-Page´s and Vorsatz (2007)
by adding a second sender to the environment. We denote sender 1, sender 2 and
receiver by S1, S2 and R, respectively. At the beginning of the game, Nature chooses
a payoff table A or B (see Table 1) with equal probability that determines the final
payoffs (in TL) of the three players.
Table 1. Payoff Tables
Table A Sender 1 Sender 2 Receiver
Action U 4.5 4.5 1
Action D 0.5 0.5 9
Table B Sender 1 Sender 2 Receiver
Action U 0.5 0.5 9
Action D 4.5 4.5 1
The senders are privately informed about the realized payoff table. Depending on
the information observed, S1 and S2 respectively choose possibly mixed actions p and
q from the set of messages M = {A,B}. Here, p and q denote the probabilities that
the message A is submitted by S1 and S2, respectively. After observing the messages
submitted by the two senders, the receiver chooses a possibly mixed action r from
the set of actions {U,D}, showing the probability that U is played by the receiver.
We analyze two games that differ with respect to the mode of communication of the
senders with the receiver, namely the Simultaneous and the Sequential Game. In
the Simultaneous Game, the two senders simultaneously transmit a message to the
receiver after observing the actual state. Then, the receiver takes an action knowing
that the senders have not observed each others’ messages. In the Sequential Game,
first moves sender 1, transmitting a message. Then, after observing the message of
sender 1, sender 2 transmits a message. Knowing that sender 2 has observed the
message transmitted by sender 1, the receiver takes an action that determines the
payoffs of all three players. The third game we consider is the Choice Game, where
the receiver moves first and chooses whether the Simultaneous or the Sequential
Game is going to be played, and then the chosen game is played accordingly.
2.1 The Simultaneous Game
In the Simultaneous Game, both senders have two information sets corresponding
to the events that the actual payoff table is A or B. When the actual state is A,
the strategies of S1 and S2 are pA and qA, respectively denoting the probabilities
that sender 1 and sender 2 choose message A when the actual state is A. Similarly,
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when the actual state is B, the strategies of S1 and S2 are pB and qB, respectively
denoting the probabilities that sender 1 and sender 2 choose message A when
the actual state is B. The receiver, on the other hand, has four information sets
corresponding to four possible message pairs that can be submitted by the two
senders. Here, rAA, rAB, rBA and rBB denote the probabilities that action U is
played corresponding to the observed messages of S1 and S2 (which are denoted in
the subscripts of r in order). The receiver forms the beliefs µAA, µAB, µBA, and µBB,
each denoting the belief that the actual state is A after observing the corresponding
set of messages by S1 and S2 specified in the subscripts, respectively.
Proposition 1. Any sequential equilibrium of the Simultaneous Game satisfies
pA = pB = p ∈ [0, 1];
qA = qB = q ∈ [0, 1];
with the supporting belief system is µij =
1
2
for every ij ∈ {AA,AB,BA,BB} on
the equilibrium path.
Corollary 1. The probability of observing an untruthful message by any of the
senders in any sequential equilibrium is 1/2.
This says that no information is revealed in any equilibrium. Sender 1 plays B when
the true state is A with probability (1− pA) and choose A when the true state is B
with probability pB. As each state is equally likely and pA = pB in any equilibrium,
it is straightforward that the receiver expects to see an untruthful message from
S1 with probability one half. The same argument is true for the messages of sender 2.
Remark: The receiver’s strategies should satisfy the following condition in order
to have pA = pB = p > 0 and qA = qB = q > 0 as a sequential equilibrium:
p =
rBB − rBA
rAA − rAB + rBB − rBA
and q =
rBB − rAB
rAA − rAB + rBB − rBA
These conditions imply that rAA > rAB, rAA > rBA, rBB > rAB and rBB > rBA in
any equilibrium where the senders use completely mixed strategies.2
2.2 The Sequential Game
In the Sequential Game, sender 1 has two information sets, whereas sender 2 has
four information sets. The strategies of S1 when the actual state is n ∈ {A,B} is
denoted by pn as before. The strategies of S2 (i.e. the probability that message A
2For instance, p = 3
4
, q = 3
4
and rAA =
1
3
, rBB =
1
2
, rAB = rBA =
1
4
constitute an equilibrium.
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is chosen) when the actual state is n ∈ {A,B} and the sender 1 has communicated
message i ∈ {A,B} is denoted by qn(i). The receiver, again, has four information
sets, at which rAA, rAB, rBA and rBB are the probabilities that action U is played
corresponding to the observed messages of S1 and S2, denoted in the subscripts
of r, respectively. The receiver forms the beliefs µij showing the probability that
the actual state is A after observing the message i ∈ {A,B} from sender 1 and
j ∈ {A,B} from sender 2.
Proposition 2. In any sequential equilibrium of the Sequential Game,
pA = pB = p ∈ [0, 1];
qA(A) = qB(A) = q1 ∈ [0, 1];
qA(B) = qB(B) = q2 ∈ [0, 1];
with the supporting belief system µij =
1
2
for ij ∈ {AA,AB,BA,BB} on the
equilibrium path.
Corollary 2. The probability of observing an untruthful message by any of the
senders in any sequential equilibrium is 1
2
.
As S1 plays B when the true state is A with probability (1 − pA) and choose A
when the true state is B with probability pB, it is straightforward that the receiver
expects to see an untruthful message by S1 with probability one half. The expected
probability of seeing an untruthful message by S2 is given by the following expression:
1
2
[
(1− pA)(1− qA(B)) + pA(1− qA(A))
]
+
1
2
[
pBqB(A) + (1− pB)qB(B)
]
which is also equal to 1/2 in any equilibria.
2.3 The Choice Game
Since the equilibria of the Simultaneous Game and the Sequential Game induce the
same expected payoff to the receiver, she should be indifferent choosing between
the two games. After the receiver’s choice of the communication mode, one of the
equilibria of the chosen game is played according to the requirements of sequential
rationality.
2.4 Hypotheses
Based on the predictions of the model, we obtain several hypotheses regarding the
truth-telling levels of the senders and trust levels of the receivers.
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Hypothesis 1. (Truth-telling in the Simultaneous Game) Both senders will
tell the truth with 50% probability in the Simultaneous Game.
Hypothesis 2. (Truth-telling in the Sequential Game) Both senders will tell
the truth with 50% probability in the Sequential Game and truth-telling by Sender
2 will be independent of the observed message of Sender 1.
Hypothesis 3. (Trust in the Simultaneous Game) Upon observing a non-
conflictive message, the receiver will trust with 50% probability in the Simultaneous
Game.
Hypothesis 4. (Trust in the Sequential Game) Upon observing a non-
conflictive message, the receiver will trust with 50% probability in the Sequential
Game.
Hypothesis 5. (Receiver Behavior in the Choice Treatment) The receiver
will choose each of the Simultaneous and Sequential Games with 50% probability.
3 Experimental Design and Procedures
All experimental sessions were conducted in the Social Sciences Laboratory at TOBB
University of Economics and Technology during March 28-30, 2012. We sent a school
wide invitation e-mail to undergraduate students informing that for the invited ex-
periment they could register online for a date and time they choose. Those who
registered also received reminder e-mails 1 day before the session. In total, the ex-
periment was conducted over 8 sessions, one with 8 subjects the rest with 12 subjects.
We had 92 Subjects in total and each session lasted abut 55-60 minutes.
Our design is a modification of the setup used in Sa´nchez-Page´s and Vorsatz
(2007, 2008) and Peeters et al. (2008). Each session consisted of three treatments
which we term as the Simultaneous Treatment, the Sequential Treatment and the
Choice Treatment. The order of these treatments during a session could be either
Simultaneous-Sequential-Choice or Sequential-Simultaneous-Choice. Each treatment
lasted 12 periods. Before the experiment began, subjects were randomly assigned to
groups of 4 and there were 23 groups in total. At the start of each period, two of
these 4 subjects were assigned sender roles, one was assigned the receiver role and
one was assigned the observer role.3 During the 12 periods in a given treatment, each
3We consider the observer role so as to check whether our subjects, when they are neither the
receiver nor a sender, are able to make correct guesses about the outcomes of the games.
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subject played 6 times as a sender, 3 times as a receiver and 3 times as an observer.
The order of role assignments was randomly determined.4
In the Simultaneous Treatment, Subjects played the following game for each
period: First subjects learned about their role assignments for that period which
could either be sender 1, sender 2, the receiver or the observer. Afterwards, sender
1 and sender 2 were informed about the true state (the payoff table being played)
which could be either “Table A” or “Table B”. Following this, sender 1 and sender
2 simultaneously and without seeing each other’s decision, decided on the message
they want to send to the receiver. The messages could be either “The payoff table is
A” or “The payoff table is B”. The observer, on the other hand, was also informed
about the payoff table and chose one of the following guesses: “The receiver will
earn 9 and sender 1 and sender 2 will each earn 0.5” or “The receiver will earn 1 and
sender 1 and sender 2 will each earn 4.5”. Next, the receiver was informed about the
messages of sender 1 and sender 2 on the same screen and was asked which payoff
table she thinks is more likely to be the correct one. Then the receiver choose among
two possible actions: “U” or “D”. After this choice of action, the payoffs were realized
accordingly and a summary of the period was shown to the senders, the receiver and
the observer. For the senders and the receiver, this summary includes information
about the true state, the signals sent, the belief of the receiver, the action chosen by
the receiver and the payoffs to the senders and to the receiver. For the observer the
summary includes her guess, the earnings of the receiver and the senders and her
own earning. If her guess was correct, the observer earned 5 TL for that period and
if not 0 TL.
The Sequential Treatment differs from the above setup in the way the senders
acted. In this treatment, sender 1 first chose the message to be sent and then this
was showed first to sender 2, who in turn chose her message to be sent. The rest of
the game is similar. In the Choice Treatment on the other hand, the receiver acted
first and chose the way she preferred the messages to be sent. In particular, for each
period, the subject with the receiver role chose if she wants to play the game as in
the Simultaneous Treatment or the game as in the Sequential Treatment. Following
this choice, the game corresponding to the choice of the receiver was played.
4Given that the subjects make choices in the same group for 36 periods, it may be a valid concern
that anonymity may have been somewhat disregarded as the repetition could have an effect in the
experiment even though the roles are randomly assigned in each period within a group. Since all
treatments may be affected to some extent by the repetition, we believe that the differences in
treatments are not due to the repetition effect. Moreover, our experimental results indicate that
the behavior of the players are not significantly different than the theoretical predictions of the one-
shot game in most of the cases (see Section 4). As the choice of running sessions with groups of 4 is
essentially done for using non-parametric tests for the receiver behavior in the Choice Treatment,
our estimation finding (Result 4 in Section 6) in that regard shows that the receiver values the
information acquired in the previous period more than the information acquired in all other past
periods in the Choice Treatment. These results imply that the learning effect due to repetition
must be minimal.
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After the three treatments were finished, subject answered several questions about
their choices during the experiment. Following this, payments were displayed on the
subject’s screen. Each subject was paid the sum of her average earnings in the
Simultaneous Treatment, average earnings in the Sequential Treatment and average
earnings in the Choice Treatment plus a participation fee of 5 TL. Average total
earnings (including the participation fee) were 14.26 TL and at the time of the
experiment, 1 TL corresponded to 0.6325 USD.
4 Experimental Results
92 subjects in our experiment constituted 23 distinct groups. In the following three
subsections (4.1, 4.2, and 4.3) we calculate the percentage of the variables of in-
terest (truth-telling, trust, non-conflicting messages, truthfulness of non-conflicting
messages etc.) for all distinct groups and use these independent observations in our
analysis. Numerical values reported in the tables correspond to the mean value of
the associated variable across all distinct groups. Below, we start with describing
the sender behavior.
4.1 Senders
Considering all three treatments in the experiment, we find that the mean percentage
of truthful messages per group is close to 53%. However, it is not significantly above
the theoretical prediction of 50% (p-value is 0.057 in a Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
Although this is consonant with the previous studies finding that subjects in general
tell the truth more often than predicted, termed as overcommunication (see Section
1.1.), we see that adding a second sender overshadows this phenomenon.
In Table 2, we summarize the behavior of senders in plays where they act simul-
taneously. The two columns respectively show sender behavior under all plays in
the Simultaneous Treatment and plays in the Choice Treatment where receivers pre-
ferred the senders to play simultaneously.5 Senders exhibit excessive truth-telling in
the Simultaneous Treatment by sending truthful messages with a frequency of 54%;
however, we fail to reject Hypothesis 1 (p-value is 0.083 in a Wilcoxon signed-rank
test). And, senders nearly randomize between truth and lie in the Choice Treatment
in plays where the receiver prefers simultaneous messages.
Under simultaneous mode of communication, the two senders’ agreement fre-
quency is above 50%.6 And, with a frequency of 58.2%, the non-conflicting messages
5Looking at the 276 instances during the Choice Treatment, we see that the receivers preferred
simultaneous messages in 152 cases (55%) and sequential messages in 124 cases (45%).
6The theoretical predictions for the probabilities in the first and last rows are 1/2, whereas
the theoretical prediction for the probability that the two senders’ messages are non-conflictive in
simultaneous plays is pAqA + (1− pA)(1− qA) ∈ [0, 1].
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in the Simultaneous Treatment are considerably more likely to be truthful than the
theoretical prediction of 50% (p-value is 0.054 in a Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
Table 2. Sender Behavior with Simultaneous Messagesa
Simultaneous Treatment Choice Treatment
% Sender is truthful 54.0∗ 49.0∗
% Senders are non-conflictive 51.4∗∗ 53.4∗∗
% Non-conflicting messages 58.2∗ 50.2∗
are correct
N 23 23
a Observations under the Choice Treatment only includes cases where receivers preferred the
senders to act simultaneously.
∗ The theoretical prediction is 50.
∗∗ The theoretical prediction is arbitrary in [0,100].
Sender behavior when the two senders act sequentially is summarized in Table
3.7 The first column reports sender behavior under all plays in the Sequential Treat-
ment, the second column reports plays in the Choice Treatment where receivers
preferred the senders to play sequentially. Our results are somewhat in line with
Hypothesis 2 about truth telling. In the Sequential Treatment, while sender 1 per-
fectly randomizes, sender 2 tells the truth with a probability higher than 50% that is
not significantly different than the theoretical prediction. However, truth-telling by
Sender 2 is not independent of the earlier message of Sender 1. The probability with
which sender 2 is truthful given that sender 1 lies is 58.9% compared to 54% when
sender 1 is truthful (and in the Choice Treatment where the receivers choose sequen-
tial mode of communication, this figure goes up to 63 %). Hence, the contribution
to the excessive truth-telling in sequential plays comes from sender 2.
We see that non-conflicting messages are observed less frequently in the Sequen-
tial Treatment (46.4%) than in the Simultaneous Treatment (51.4%). The lower
frequency of non-conflicting messages in sequential plays is mainly due to the fact
that the subjects in the role of sender 2 have a tendency to revert the message
when sender 1 lies. Moreover, non-conflicting messages are more likely to be truth-
ful in the Simultaneous Treatment (58.2%) thanin the Sequential Treatment (54.5%).
7The theoretical predictions for the probabilities in the first two rows and the last row are
1/2. The theoretical predictions for the probabilities in all the remaining rows are arbitrary in the
interval [0, 1]. To see this, one can check that the probability that sender 2 is truthful when sender
1 is truthful is pAqA(A) + (1− pB)(1− qB(B)). Similarly, the probability that sender 2 is truthful
when sender 1 lies is (1− pA)qA(B) + pB(1− qB(A)). One can also check that the probability that
senders are non-conflictive is pAqA(A) + (1− pA)(1− qA(B)).
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Table 3. Sender Behavior with Sequential Messagesa
Sequential Treatment Choice Treatment
% Sender is truthful 53.3∗ 52.3∗
% Sender 1 is truthful 50.0∗ 51.6∗
% Sender 2 is truthful when 54.0∗∗ 48.0∗∗
sender 1 is truthful
% Sender 2 is truthful when 58.9∗∗ 63.0∗∗
sender 1 lies
% Senders are non-conflictive 46.4∗∗ 45.9∗∗
% Non-conflicting messages 54.5∗ 62.5∗
are correct
N 23 23
a Observations under the Choice Treatment only includes cases where receivers preferred the
senders to act sequentially.
∗ The theoretical prediction is 50.
∗∗ The theoretical prediction is arbitrary in [0,100].
4.2 Receivers
Prior to choosing their action, receivers in our experiment were asked to state their
beliefs. This belief elicitation stage wasn’t incentivized and each receiver was asked
which payoff table she thinks is more likely to be the correct one (answering A, B,
or equally likely). We focus on the cases where the messages by two senders are non-
conflictive, and in Table 4 we present the frequency of beliefs that are in line with
non-conflictive messages. The theoretical prediction for this frequency is 50% in all
treatments. As Table 4 shows, this prediction holds true in the Sequential Treatment
as well as in the Choice Treatment (with sequential or simultaneous messages). How-
ever, in the Simultaneous Treatment, the stated beliefs agree with the non-conflictive
messages of senders 59.2% of the time and this frequency is significantly above 50%.
Table 4. Frequency of Beliefs in Line with Non-Conflicting Messages(%)a
Simultaneous Messages Sequential Messages
Simultaneous Treatment 59.2∗ Sequential Treatment 52.3∗
Choice Treatment 50.7∗ Choice Treatment 48.6∗
N 23 23
a In the first and second columns, observations under the Choice Treatment only include cases
where receivers preferred the senders to act simultaneously and sequentially, respectively. The
values that are significantly different from 50% are given in bold.
∗ The theoretical prediction is 50.
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A variable of particular interest is the receivers’ trust frequency when the mes-
sages of the senders are non-conflictive. In the context of the game subjects played
in the experiment, we define trust as choosing the optimal action by assuming that
the non-conflictive messages of two senders is truthful. This corresponds to choosing
action D when both senders claim that the payoff table is A and choosing action
U when both senders claim that the payoff table is B. The theoretical predictions
for the frequencies of these two actions are respectively represented by 1− rAA and
rBB in all games we consider and found to be arbitrary in [0%, 100%]. On the other
hand, our experimental results in Table 5 show that the receiver’s trust frequency is
generally above 50% regardless of the way messages were sent.
In Table 5, we observe that the average of the fraction of trusted messages per
group is 56.5% for the Simultaneous Treatment and 61.3% for plays in the Choice
Treatment where receiver preferred simultaneous messages. Although the latter
value is remarkably above 50%, we cannot reject Hypothesis 3 (p-value is 0.069
in a Wilcoxon signed-rank test). When messages were sent sequentially, the average
of the fraction of trusted messages per group is 59.6% for the Sequential Treatment
and 55.1% for plays in the Choice Treatment where receiver preferred sequential
messages. The first one of these two values is significantly above 50% (p-value is
0.036 in a Wilcoxon signed-rank test), refuting Hypothesis 4.
Table 5. Receiver Trust Frequency (%)a
Simultaneous Messages Sequential Messages
Simultaneous Treatment 56.5∗ Sequential Treatment 59.6∗
Choice Treatment 61.3∗ Choice Treatment 55.1∗
N 23 23
a In the first and second columns, observations under the Choice Treatment only include cases
where receivers preferred the senders to act simultaneously and sequentially, respectively. The
values that are significantly different from 50% are given in bold.
∗ The theoretical prediction is arbitrary in [0,100].
In Table 6, we summarize the preferences of receivers over game type in the
Choice Treatment. We observe that the receivers preferred the Simultaneous mode of
communication slightly more often, but the difference between the choice frequencies
is not statistically significant, in line with Hypothesis 5.
Table 6. Receiver Behavior in the Choice Treatment
Number of Times Simultaneous Number of Subjects
Messages is Preferred
0 22
1 18
2 22
3 30
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4.3 Observers
We summarize the behavior of observers in Table 7, which presents the mean fraction
of guesses per group that the outcome of the play will be favorable for the receiver
(i.e., the receiver earns 9 TL and senders earn 0.5 TL each) as well the mean fraction
of correct guesses per group.
In the Simultaneous and Sequential Treatments, subjects are more likely to guess
that the outcome of the play will be favorable for the senders. Contrary to this, in
the Choice Treatment, subjects’ guesses shift to the other direction in plays where
the receiver preferred simultaneous messages (p-value is 0.058 in a Wilcoxon signed-
rank test). Subjects’ guesses are more likely to be wrong than correct during plays
in the Choice Treatment where the receiver preferred sequential messages (p-value is
0.075 in a Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
Table 7. Observer Behavior
% Guesses of Favorable % Correct
Outcome for the Receiver Guesses
Simultaneous Treatment 44.2∗ 45.7∗
Sequential Treatment 48.2∗ 48.2∗
Choice Treatment (Simultaneous) 59.1∗ 51.2∗
Choice Treatment (Sequential) 55.2∗ 44.5∗
N 23 23
∗ The theoretical prediction is 50.
To summarize our results, the experimental findings do not provide support to
refute the first three of our hypotheses, although the truth-telling levels and trust
levels are generally above 50% in both games. On the other hand, the frequency
of receivers’ trust to non-conflicting messages in the Sequential Treatment is signif-
icantly different than the theoretical prediction of one half, refuting Hypothesis 4.
Moreover, Sender 1 perfectly randomizes between truth telling and lies with 50% and
the behavior of Sender 2 seems to be highly dependent on the behavior of Sender
1 in the Sequential Game. In particular, Sender 2 is more likely to tell the truth
when Sender 1 lies compared to when Sender 1 tells the truth. It seems that the
overcommunication phenomenon disappears for senders acting as the first movers
in sequential plays. Furthermore, in line with Hypothesis 5, the receiver chooses in
the Choice Treatment the two modes of communication with (almost) equal proba-
bilities. In the next two sections, we will try to explore the factors underlying the
observed behavior of the subjects in our experiments.
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5 The Logit Agent Quantal Response Equilibrium
As we have already noted, the observed overtrust in our experiments shows that
during the plays the receiver might have learned that the senders were somewhat
overcommunicating. However, she does not seem to have fully exploited this knowl-
edge, for the probability of trust is less than one, unlike implied by the best response
correspondences calculated for the games in Section 2. To explain this phenomenon
that strategies with higher expected utilities are chosen with probabilities less than
one, we will add noises to the payoff functions of the players, by following the logit-
Agent Quantal Response Equilibrium (logit-AQRE) model of McKelvey and Palfrey
(1998). This behavioral model assumes that each information set of a player is
played by a different (hypothetical) agent. Each such agent will have responses in
the form of choice probabilities following a multi-nominal logit distribution, since
the noise terms added to the payoff functions are independently and identically dis-
tributed according to the log Weibull distribution. Because of these noise terms, the
responses of each agent will be smooth in the sense that each strategy which has a
higher expected utility is played with a higher probability that is less than one.
The logit-AQRE model that we will formally define in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 for
the Simultaneous and Sequential Games respectively allows the players to have not
only different rationality levels but also different non-monetary costs of lying as in
Peeters et al (2013) and Gurdal et al (2014). In Section 5.3, calculating the maximum
likelihood estimations of the parameters of this model separately for the Simultaneous
and Sequential Games, we will be able to investigate whether the observed behavior
of players differing with respect to the mode of communication can be explained by
their estimated rationality and cost parameters. Briefly, our estimations will show
that the rationality level of each player is independent of the game played and all
behavioral differences can be explained by the cost of lying, which will be found to
be different for each player in the two games. Our estimations will also reveal why
receivers prefer the Simultaneous Game more frequently than the Sequential Game.
5.1 Simultaneous Mode of Communication
In order to apply the logit-AQRE model, we define two actions truth and lie for
the two senders and two actions for the receiver in two situations: trust to sender
1 and distrust to sender 1 after observing nonconflicting and conflicting messages.
For a sender, “truth” refers to sending the message that matches the actual payoff
table and “lie” refers to doing the opposite. And, for a receiver, “trust to sender
1” refers to choosing the best response to the observed message of sender 1 and
“distrust to sender 1” refers to choosing the opposite action. We would like to point
out that if nonconflicting messages are observed and a receiver trusts to sender 1 this
also implies that s/he trusts to sender 2. When conflicting messages are observed,
trusting to sender 1 implies distrusting to sender 2 and vice versa. We denote the
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probability that sender 1 tells the truth by σ1 and the same for sender 2 by σ2.
Similarly, we let σnR stand for the probability of trusting to sender 1 upon observing
nonconflicting messages and σcR denote the probability of trusting to sender 1 upon
observing conflicting messages. Then, sender 1 and sender 2 tell the truth with
σ1 =
eγE[u1(truth)]
eγE[u1(truth)] + eγE[u1(lie)]
=
1
1 + eγ(E[u1(lie)]−E[u1(truth)])
,
σ2 =
eγE[u2(truth)]
eγE[u2(truth)] + eγE[u2(lie)]
=
1
1 + eγ(E[u2(lie)]−E[u2(truth)])
Similarly, we have receiver trusting to sender 1 (after observing nonconflicting or
conflicting messages) with probability
σR =
eγE[uR(trust to S1)]
eγE[uR(trust to S1)] + eγE[uR(distrust to S1)]
=
1
1 + eγ(E[uR(distrust to S1)]−E[uR(trust to S1)])
The parameter γ ∈ [0,∞) in the above expressions (as well as in Section 5.2) can be
positively associated with the rationality level of the players.8 When γ is arbitrarily
high, the players become fully rational and have standard best responses. On the
other hand, when γ = 0, the players are fully irrational and act randomly.
Following Peeters et al. (2013) and Gurdal et al. (2014), we also assume that
the senders have a non-monetary cost of lying denoted by ci, i = 1, 2. Then,
Proposition 3. The unique logit-AQRE (σ∗1, σ
∗
2, σ
n∗
R , σ
c∗
R ) of the simultaneous game
solves the following four equations simultaneously:
σ1 =
1
1 + eγ[4(σ
n
R
+σc
R
−1)−c1]
, σ2 =
1
1 + eγ[4(σ
n
R
−σc
R
)−c2]
,
σnR =
1
1 + eγ[8(1−σ1−σ2)]
, σcR =
1
1 + eγ[8(σ2−σ1)]
.
5.2 Sequential Mode of Communication
Let σ1 be the probability of sending truthful messages for sender 1, σ
t
2 be the
probability of sending truthful message for sender 2 after observing a truthful
message of sender 1 and σl2 be the probability of sending truthful message for
sender 2 after observing an untruthful message of sender 1. We let σnR stand for
the probability of trusting to sender 1 upon observing nonconflicting messages and
σcR represents the probability of trusting to sender 1 upon observing conflicting
messages. We assume that senders’ non-monetary cost of lying are denoted by c1
8In fact, this parameter measures the precision of the probability density function associated
with the noise term in each payoff function.
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for sender 1, ct2 for sender 2 who has observed a truthful message by sender 1 and
cl2 for sender 2 who has observed untruthful message.
Proposition 4. The unique logit-AQRE (σ∗1, σ
t∗
2 , σ
l∗
2 , σ
n∗
R , σ
c∗
R ) of the sequential
game solves the following five equations simultaneously:
σ1 =
1
1 + eγ[4(σ
n
R
+σc
R
−1)+4(σc
R
−σn
R
)(σl2−σ
t
2)−c1]
,
σt2 =
1
1 + eγ[4(σ
n
R
−σc
R
)−ct2]
, σl2 =
1
1 + eγ[4(σ
n
R
−σc
R
)−cl2]
,
σnR =
1
1 + eγ[8(1−σ1−σ
l
2)+8σ1(σ
l
2−σ
t
2)]
, σcR =
1
1 + eγ[8(σ
l
2−σ1)+8σ1(σ
t
2−σ
l
2)]
.
5.3 Maximum Likelihood Estimations
Now, we shall estimate the parameters of the logit-AQRE models we considered for
the Simultaneous and the Sequential Game. We assume that the objective to be
maximized in the Simultaneous Game is the log-likelihood function
Lsim(λsim, csim) =
∑
s∈Ssim
nsims ln(σ
sim∗
s ),
where Ssim = {truth-telling of sender 1, lie of sender 1, truth-telling of sender 2,
lie of sender 2, receiver’s trust when senders’ messages are nonconflicting, receiver’s
distrust when senders’ messages are nonconflicting, receiver’s trust to sender 1 when
senders’ messages are conflicting, receiver’s distrust to sender 1 when senders’ mes-
sages are conflicting} denotes the collection of all strategies, nsims denotes the number
of times the strategy s has been chosen, and σsim∗s is the equilibrium probability of
s in the Simultaneous Game given the rationality level λsim and the lying cost csim
of the two senders.
The log-likelihood function to be maximized in the Sequential Game is
Lseq(λseq, cseq1 , c
seq
2,t , c
seq
2,l ) =
∑
s∈Sseq
nseqs ln(σ
seq∗
s ),
where Sseq = {truth-telling of sender 1, lie of sender 1, truth-telling of sender 2 when
sender 1 was truthful, lie of sender 2 when sender 1 was truthful, truth-telling of
sender 2 when sender 1 lied, lie of sender 2 when sender 1 lied, receiver’s trust when
senders’ messages are nonconflicting, receiver’s distrust when senders’ messages are
nonconflicting, receiver’s trust to sender 1 when senders’ messages are conflicting,
receiver’s distrust to sender 1 when senders’ messages are conflicting} denotes the
collection of all strategies, nseqs denotes the number of times the strategy s has been
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chosen, and σseq∗s is the equilibrium probability of s in the Sequential Game given
the rationality level λseq, the lying cost cseq1 of sender 1, the lying cost c
seq
2,t of sender
2 when sender 1 was truthful and the lying cost cseq2,l of sender 2 when sender 1 lied.
Tables 8 and 9 present our estimation results for the rationality level, lying costs,
and the expected utilities of the players in the Simultaneous and the Sequential
Game, respectively. These two tables show that the hypothesis that ‘the average
bootstrapped value of the rationality parameter is zero’ is rejected both in the Si-
multaneous Game (p-value: 0.05) and in the Sequential Game (p-value: 0.02), while
λsim and λseq are not found to be statistically different (p-value: 0.71). Likewise,
the hypothesis that ‘the cost of lying is zero’ is rejected for senders in the Simul-
taneous Game (p-value: 0.04) as well as for sender 2 in the Sequential Game when
sender 1 lied (p-value: 0.03). In the Sequential Game, the same hypothesis cannot
be rejected, however, for sender 1 (p-value: 0.28) or for sender 2 when sender 1 was
truthful (p-value: 0.11).
Table 8. Logit-AQRE Estimation Results for the Simultaneous Game∗
λsim 0.29
[0, 0.37]
(0.19, 0.12)
csim 0.70
[0, 3.19]
(1.87, 1.08)
Expected utility of each sender 2.41
Expected utility of receiver under nonconflicting messages 2.84
Expected utility of receiver under conflicting messages 2.48
∗ We exclude simultaneous plays in the Choice Treatment. In brackets, we report the 95 percent
(standardized) confidence interval (obtained via bootstrapping with 1,000 repetitions using 70 per-
cent of the experimental data). Below the brackets, we report the mean and the standard deviation
of the bootstrapped parameters.
The results in Tables 8 and 9 also show that the expected utility of both sender
1 and sender 2 are higher in the Sequential Game than in the Simultaneous Game.
Oppositely, the expected utility of the receiver is always lower in the Sequential
Game. In addition, both in the Simultaneous and Sequential Game, the receiver
becomes better off when the messages of the two senders are nonconflicting and
becomes worse off otherwise. Below, we summarize these results.
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Table 9. Logit-AQRE Estimation Results for the Sequential Game∗
λseq 0.14
[0.05, 0.27]
(0.14, 0.07)
cseq1 0.10
[0, 0.36]
(0.08, 0.15)
cseq2t 0.85
[0, 1.43]
(0.75, 0.61)
cseq2l 1.94
[0, 4.08]
(2.65, 1.40)
Expected utility of sender 1 2.50
Expected utility of sender 2 when sender 1 was truthful 2.46
Expected utility of sender 2 when sender 1 lied 2.46
Expected utility of receiver under nonconflicting messages 2.61
Expected utility of receiver under conflicting messages 2.40
∗ We exclude sequential plays in the Choice Treatment. In brackets, we report the 95 percent (stan-
dardized) confidence interval (obtained via bootstrapping with 1,000 repetitions using 70 percent
of the experimental data). Below the brackets, we report the mean and the standard deviation of
the bootstrapped parameters.
Estimation Result 1. Logit-AQRE estimations show that the subjects’ rationality
levels in the Simultaneous and Sequential Game are statistically the same and dif-
ferent from zero. Likewise, the cost of lying is statistically different from zero for
senders in the Simultaneous Game and for sender 2 in the Sequential Game when
sender 1 lied. In terms of expected utilities, the Sequential Game, as compared to the
Simultaneous Game, makes both sender 1 and 2 better off while making the receiver
worse off. In addition, in each game the receiver becomes better off when the two
senders submit nonconflicting messages.
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6 Logistic Analysis for the Choice Treatment
Here, we estimate the determinants of the observed receiver behavior in the Choice
Treatment. Table 10 reports the logistic regression results. The dependent variable
is the simultaneous choice in all of the specifications. In the first specification, we
consider the effects of receivers’ average payoffs over the simultaneous and sequential
plays, updated in the Choice Treatment. Average payoffs do not have a statistically
significant effect on the choice probability. For the second specification, we find
that receiver is 2.43 times more likely to select simultaneous play in cases where
the previous play was simultaneous and the receiver earned the high payoff than in
cases where the previous play was sequential and the receiver earned the low payoff.
The receiver is 53% less likely to select simultaneous play if the previous play was
sequential and the receiver earned the high payoff relative to the case in which the
previous play was sequential and the receiver earned the low payoff. The probability
of choosing simultaneous play when the previous play was simultaneous and the
receiver earned the low payoff is not statistically significantly different from the case
where the previous play was sequential and the receiver earned the low payoff.
Estimation Result 2. The receiver is (i) more likely to select simultaneous play if
the previous play was simultaneous and (ii) much more likely to select simultaneous
play if the previous play was simultaneous and the receiver earned the high payoff
relative to the case in which the previous play was sequential.
Table 10 also shows that ratio of nonconflicting messages in the Simultaneous
Treatment has a positive effect on the probability of selecting simultaneous choice.
In our estimations, we have used the ratio of nonconflicting messages in the simul-
taneous and sequential treatments as a control, being representative of the groups’
cooperative tendencies or abilities to coordinate. These establish the following.
Estimation Result 3. High ratio of nonconflicting messages in both the Si-
multaneous and the Sequential Treatment increases the likelihood of simultaneous
choice in the Choice Treatment; however the estimated impact is much larger in the
Simultaneous Treatment than in the Sequential Treatment.
In the first, fifth, sixth and seventh specifications, the updated average payoffs
of the receivers in the simultaneous and sequential plays are also included. Our
estimations show that both variables are statistically insignificant at 95% confidence
level and the magnitudes of the coefficients are close to one, suggesting the following.
Estimation Result 4. The receiver values the information acquired in the previous
period more than the information acquired in all other past periods.
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Table 10. Logistic Analysis of Simultaneous Choice
I II III IV V VI VII
Simwon† (1 if previous play was simultaneous and 2.43∗∗ 1.81 1.14 2.27∗ 1.72 1.12
receiver earned high payoff) (2.06) (0.84) (0.32) (1.92) (0.8) (0.28)
Seqwon† (1 if previous play was sequential and 0.47∗ 0.68 0.43∗∗ 0.43∗ 0.67 0.41∗∗
receiver earned high payoff) (-1.74) (-0.71) (-2.41) (-1.93) (-0.74) (-2.44)
Simlost† (1 if previous play was simultaneous and 1.18 2.02 1.08 1.90
receiver earned low payoff) (0.42) (1.33) (0.21) (1.24)
Simwonnc† (1 if previous play was simultaneous with 3.67∗∗ 3.67∗∗ 3.70∗∗ 3.68∗∗
nonconflicting messages and receiver earned high payoff) (1.96) (1.96) (2.04) (2.04)
Seqwonnc† (1 if previous play was sequential with 0.99 0.88
nonconflicting messages and receiver earned high payoff) (-0.01) (-0.24)
Simlostnc† (1 if previous play was simultaneous with 0.72 0.70
nonconflicting messages and receiver earned low payoff) (-0.71) (-0.77)
Seqlostnc† (1 if previous play was sequential with 2.05 2.10
nonconflicting messages and receiver earned low payoff) (1.33) (1.45)
Average payoff of the receivers over simultaneous plays, 0.97 0.95 0.90 0.91
updated in the Choice Treatment (-0.14) (-0.27) (-0.59) (-0.51)
Average payoff of the receivers over sequential plays, 1.26 1.27∗ 1.26∗ 1.26
updated in the Choice Treatment (1.47) (1.76) (1.67) (1.61)
Ratio of nonconflicting messages in the Simultaneous 8.88 2.88 2.59 2.53 5.26 4.73 4.68
Treatment (1.6) (0.98) (0.95) (0.90) (1.33) (1.37) (1.28)
Ratio of nonconflicting messages in the Sequential 1.46 1.30 1.27 1.26 1.65 1.72 1.71
Treatment (0.33) (0.26) (0.22) (0.22) (0.49) (0.5) (0.50)
Constant 0.11 0.54 0.40 0.64 0.14 0.13 0.19
(-1.29) (-0.76) (-1.01) (-0.59) (-1.26) (-1.21) (-1.00)
Pseudo R2 0.015 0.063 0.086 0.079 0.072 0.095 0.088
Dependent variable is simultaneous choice. Odds ratios are reported, z-values are reported in parenthesis. Standard errors are
clustered at the group level. * and ** denote significance at the 90% and 95% confidence levels respectively. † := Dummy
variables.
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In Table 10 we have also decomposed the results of the previous period depending
on whether the messages were nonconflicting. The receiver is statistically signifi-
cantly more likely to select simultaneous play if the previous play was simultaneous,
the receiver earned the high payoff and the messages were nonconflicting than all
other cases. Additionally, the receiver is statistically significantly less likely to
select simultaneous play if the previous play was sequential and the receiver earned
the high payoff than all other cases. Whether the messages were nonconlifcting in
sequential play does not statistically significantly affect the probability of choosing
silmultanoeus play.
Estimation Result 5. If the previous play is simultaneous, the receiver is more
likely to choose simultaneous play when the messages were nonconflicting and the
receiver earned the high payoff relative to all other cases. On the contrary, if the
previous play is sequential, whether the messages were conflicting or nonconflict-
ing does not have a statistically significant effect on the probability of choosing
simultaneous play and the receiver has the lowest probability of choosing simultane-
ous play when the previous play was sequential and the receiver earned the high payoff.
7 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
Truth-telling frequencies tend to stay above 50% during the experiments, but the
levels turn out to be not significantly different than the sequential equilibrium pre-
dictions. Interestingly, in the Choice Treatment all senders –except for those who
act as Sender 2 and move after Sender 1 lies– randomize between truth-telling and
lie almost perfectly; and Sender 1 in the Sequential Treatment chooses truth-telling
with exactly 50%. This suggests that the addition of a second sender overshadows
the overcommunication phenomenon that has been observed in the similar settings
with a single sender.
Moreover, the nature of truth-telling seems to differ between sequential and si-
multaneous plays. With sequential messages, we observe that a substantial fraction
of senders acting as Sender 2 deliberately try to revert the messages of Sender 1.
In particular, they have much higher truth-telling frequencies in cases where sender
1 lied compared to the cases where sender 1 was truthful. This effect generates a
higher frequency of non-conflicting sender messages during the Simultaneous Treat-
ment compared to the Sequential Treatment. The reason is that when two senders
act simultaneously, none of them can condition her message on the message of the
other. In our study, we also observe that in both of the Simultaneous and Sequential
Treatments, when a pair of messages by the two senders is non-conflictive, it is more
likely to be truthful than being non-informative. This can be seen as the reminiscent
of the overcommunication phenomenon observed in the previous studies.
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In response to a non-conflicting pair of messages by the two senders, the receiver’s
trust frequency is calculated to be above 50% during both of the Simultaneous and
Sequential Treatments. In this manner, the receiver behavior exhibits overtrust
which is also observed in the previous experimental studies. Note that, given the
observation that non-conflicting messages are more likely to be truthful than not,
the best response of the receiver subjects in this experiment would be fully trusting
them. When the receiver subjects are given the option of choosing between sequential
and simultaneous plays at the last treatment of the experiment, we see that a slight
majority is more likely to prefer simultaneous plays.
We have investigated whether these results could be explained by a logit-AQRE
model where senders have non-monetary costs of lying. Maximum Likelihood Esti-
mations of the model using the experimental data have showed that in the Simulta-
neous Game the presence of another sender does not eliminate a sender’s intrinsic
motive of truth-telling, recently observed in the laboratory experiments of Peeters
et al. (2013) and Gurdal et al. (2014), both considering single sender-receiver games
with simultaneous plays. However, in the Sequential Game sender 1 is found to be
unburdened with the cost of lying, and this is also true for sender 2 when sender 1
was truthful. On the other hand, when sender 1 lied in the Sequential Game, sender
2 is observed to have a nonzero cost of lying. Evidently, for the Sequential Game
one can argue that a sender will not have any intrinsic motives for truth-telling if
and only if he knows that the other sender is likely (with some nonzero probability)
to be truthful. Interestingly, we have also observed that the welfare of both senders
are higher, while the welfare of the receiver is lower, in the Sequential Game than in
the Simultaneous Game. This last finding suggests that the mode of communication
may be a critical tool of design in principal-agent problems with multiple agents.
Lastly, we have estimated the determinants of the receiver behavior in the Choice
Treatment using logistic regressions. We have found that the receiver is more likely to
select simultaneous play if the previous play was simultaneous and the receiver earned
the high payoff and much more likely to select simultaneous play if the messages were
nonconflicting additionally. Whether the messages are conflicting in a sequential play,
does not statistically significantly affect the probability of choosing simultaneous play
the next period. The receiver is statistically significantly the least likely to select
simultaneous play if the receiver earned the high payoff in a sequential play in the last
period. Also, high ratio of nonconflicting messages in both the Simultaneous and the
Sequential Treatment increases the likelihood of simultaneous choice in the Choice
Treatment, while the estimated impact is larger in the Simultaneous Treatment than
in the Sequential Treatment. In addition, we have found that the receiver values the
information acquired in the previous period more than the information acquired in
all other past periods.
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Appendix A. Instructions
Welcome!
Thank you for your participation. The aim of this study is to understand how
people decide in certain situations. From now on, talking to each other is prohibited.
Violation of this rule requires immediate termination of the experiment. Please raise
your hand to ask questions. This way, everybody will hear your question and our
answer.
The experiment will be conducted through the computer and you will make all
your decisions using the computer. Your earnings depend on your decisions as well
as the decisions of other participants. These earnings and your participation fee will
be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. The experiment consists of 3
different parts. We start with describing Part 1.
Part 1
In this part of the experiment you will play a game which will last 12 periods.
Before the first period, the system will assign you to groups of 4. These groups will
remain the same throughout the experiment. A participant will only interact with
participants from her own group but will not get to know the identity of other group
members during or after the experiment.
Now, let’s have a closer look at the game. Please do not hesitate to ask questions.
In the beginning of each period, 2 participants in your group will be assigned the
sender roles, 1 participant will be assigned the receiver role and 1 participant will
be assigned the observer role. At the end of 12 periods, each of you will have played
6 times as a sender, 3 times as a receiver and 3 times as an observer. The order of
these role assignments is random.
During each period, after role assignments have been made, the system will choose
one of the following: Table A or Table B. It is equally likely for the system to choose
Table A or Table B. The earnings in that period will depend on the table chosen by
the system and the choice of action U or action D by the receiver.
Payoff Tables
Table A G1 G2 Receiver
Action U 4.5 4.5 1
Action D 0.5 0.5 9
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Table B G1 G2 Receiver
Action U 0.5 0.5 9
Action D 4.5 4.5 1
At each period, one of the senders in the group will be named as G1 and the other
will be named as G2. These roles will be randomly assigned and G1 and G2 will
earn the same amount for that period. For example, if the system chooses Table A
and the receiver chooses action U, both G1 and G2 will earn 4.5 TL and the receiver
will earn 1 TL for that period.
Senders’ task
At the beginning of each period, G1 and G2 will be informed about the table chosen
by the system for that period. G1 and G2 will make the first decisions of that period.
This decision is the choice of the message to be delivered to the receiver and telling
whether the system chose Table A or Table B. Since these messages are going to be
sent simultaneously, no sender will get to know the message of the other sender. The
senders are free to decide whether their messages are correct or not.
Receiver’s task
The receiver will first see the messages of G1 and G2, but will not know the table
chosen by the system. At the screen that the receiver observes these messages, she
will be asked her belief about the actual table that will determine the payoffs for
that round.
In the next screen, the receiver will choose action U or action D.
After the receiver makes her choice, the earnings will be determined based on the
actual table chosen by the system and the choice of the receiver.
Observer’s task
The observer will guess what the earnings of the senders and the receiver will be in
a given period. Due to the structure of the game, her guess could be one of the two
types:
1) Receiver: 9 TL; G1 and G2: 0.5 TL.
2) Receiver: 1 TL; G1 and G2: 4.5 TL.
If her guess is correct, the observer will earn 5 TL for that period and 0 TL otherwise.
At the end of each period, a summary screen will provide information about the
choices in that period and the earnings.
Payment
Based on your earnings for each period, your average earnings per period will be
calculated. You can see this amount at the bottom of the summary screen. The
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average earnings at the end of period 12 will be your earnings from part 1 of the
experiment.
Your total earnings in the experiment will be “earnings in part 1” + “earnings
in part 2” + “earnings in part 3” + “a participation fee of 5 TL”.
Part 2
Now, we will start part 2 of the experiment. In this part of the experiment, you will
play a game that will last for 12 periods. Your group and the payoff tables in this
part will be the same as in the first part of the experiment.
The new game is similar to the game used in the previous part of the experiment,
but it has the following differences:
In this game, the sender chosen as G1 will first choose her message to the receiver
and the other sender, G2, will see this message and then choose her own message.
The receiver will see the messages of G1 and G2, and again she will not know the
real payoff table chosen by the system.
The rest of the game is the same as in the previous part. The assignment of the
roles G1 and G2 will be random as before.
Part 3
Now, we will start part 3 of the experiment. In this part of the experiment, you will
play a game that will last for 12 periods. Your group and the payoff tables in this
part will be the same as in the first part of the experiment.
But, during each period in this part of the experiment, the receiver will choose
the way that the senders will convey their messages. In other words, the receiver will
decide whether the senders will send their messages simultaneously or sequentially.
As you may remember, these are the methods for sending messages used in the two
parts of the experiment.
To summarize,
- If the receiver decides the messages to be sent simultaneously, both G1 and G2
will choose their messages at the same time, without seeing each other’s messages.
- If the receiver decides the messages to be sent sequentially, first G1 will choose
her message and then G2 will observe this message and choose her message.
The assignment of the roles G1 and G2 will be random as before.
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Appendix B. Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. First, we derive the best responses of the players at each
information set. The best responses of S1 after tables A and B have been observed
are given as:
pA ∈


{1} if qA(rAA − rBA) + (1− qA)(rAB − rBB) > 0
[0,1] if qA(rAA − rBA) + (1− qA)(rAB − rBB) = 0
{0} if qA(rAA − rBA) + (1− qA)(rAB − rBB) < 0
pB ∈


{1} if qB(rAA − rBA) + (1− qB)(rAB − rBB) < 0
[0, 1] if qB(rAA − rBA) + (1− qB)(rAB − rBB) = 0
{0} if qB(rAA − rBA) + (1− qB)(rAB − rBB) > 0
On the other hand, the best responses of S2 after tables A and B have been observed
are as follows:
qA ∈


{1} if pA(rAA − rAB) + (1− pA)(rBA − rBB) > 0
[0, 1] if pA(rAA − rAB) + (1− pA)(rBA − rBB) = 0
{0} if pA(rAA − rAB) + (1− pA)(rBA − rBB) < 0
qB ∈


{1} if pB(rAA − rAB) + (1− pB)(rBA − rBB) < 0
[0, 1] if pB(rAA − rAB) + (1− pB)(rBA − rBB) = 0
{0} if pB(rAA − rAB) + (1− pB)(rBA − rBB) > 0
The receiver’s best responses after observing a message ij ∈ {AA,AB,BA,BB}
depend on the beliefs formed at that information set:
rij ∈


{1} if µij <
1
2
[0, 1] if µij =
1
2
{0} if µij >
1
2
And, the beliefs, calculated by Bayes’ rule (whenever possible), are as follows:
µAA =
pAqA
pAqA + pBqB
, µAB =
pA(1− qA)
pA(1− qA) + pB(1− qB)
,
µBA =
(1− pA)qA
(1− pA)qA + (1− pB)qB
, µBB =
(1− pA)(1− qA)
(1− pA)(1− qA) + (1− pB)(1− qB)
.
We want to show that the senders use the same strategy at the two information
sets. To arrive at a contradiction, we consider the following cases: (1) One of the
senders uses different strategies, while the other sender uses the same strategy at
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the two information sets; (2) Both of the senders use different strategies at the two
information sets.
Case 1: Suppose that S1 uses different strategies, i.e. pA 6= pB; and, without
loss of generality, let’s assume pA > pB. First, consider the case qA = qB = q ∈ (0, 1).
Then, the consistency of beliefs requires µAA >
1
2
, µAB >
1
2
, µBA <
1
2
, and µBB <
1
2
.
The best responses of the receiver at each information set under these beliefs become
rAA = 0, rAB = 0, rBA = 1, and rBB = 1. But then, S1’s best responses are pA = 0
and pB = 1, which contradicts to our hypothesis that pA > pB. Now, suppose that
qA = qB = q = 0. With these strategies, the beliefs become µAB >
1
2
and µBB <
1
2
.
Having these beliefs, the receiver’s best responses can be found as rAB = 0 and
rBB = 1. Then, the best responses of S1 are pA = 0 and pB = 1, again contradicting
to our hypothesis. Next, assume that qA = qB = q = 1. Under these strategies (given
the hypothesis pA > pB), the beliefs can be calculated as µAA >
1
2
, and µBA <
1
2
with the associated best responses for the receiver being rAA = 0 and rBA = 1. This
in turn suggests that the best responses of S1 should be pA = 0 and pB = 1, which
provides the desired contradiction to pA > pB.
Case 2: Suppose that pA 6= pB and qA 6= qB. Without loss of generality, we
assume that pA > pB ≥ 0 and qA > qB ≥ 0. Then, the beliefs can be calculated as
µAA >
1
2
and µBB <
1
2
. The best responses of the receiver at these information sets
become rAA = 0 and rBB = 1. If qA < 1, for pA > 0 to be the best response of S1,
the best responses of the receiver should satisfy rAA = rBA = 0 and rAB = rBB = 1.
But if rAA = rBA = 0 and rAB = rBB = 1, then qA = 0, which is a contradiction
as qA > qB ≥ 0, by assumption. If qA = 1, then for having pA > 0 as a part of
equilibrium, the best response of the receiver should satisfy rAA = rBA = 0. In turn,
qA = 1 can be a best response to these strategies only if rAB = 0 and pA = 1 (in
addition to rAA = rBA = 0, rBB = 1). But, then pB equals to 1 if qB < 1 and qB
equals to 1 if pB < 1, which is the desired contradiction (since by assumption pB 6= 1
and qB 6= 1 as pB < pA and qB < qA).
Since the senders are symmetric we exclude the symmetric situations. In all the
other cases, we get at least one of the beliefs different than 1
2
. The corresponding
best responses of the receiver at such information sets are pure strategies; and,
the best responses of the senders against these pure strategies give the desired
contradiction unless the senders use the same strategies at each information sets.
Also, when pA = pB ∈ (0, 1) and qA = qB ∈ (0, 1), the beliefs can be easily calculated
as µij =
1
2
and they can be assigned in a consistent way off the equilibrium path. 
Proof of Proposition 2. The best response of S1 after table A is observed is as
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follows:
pA ∈


{1} if qA(A)rAA + (1− qA(A))rAB − qA(B)rBA − (1− qA(B))rBB > 0
[0, 1] if qA(A)rAA + (1− qA(A))rAB − qA(B)rBA − (1− qA(B))rBB = 0
{0} if qA(A)rAA + (1− qA(A))rAB − qA(B)rBA − (1− qA(B))rBB < 0
The best response of S1 after table B is observed is as follows:
pB ∈


{1} if qB(A)rAA + (1− qB(A))rAB − qB(B)rBA − (1− qB(B))rBB < 0
[0, 1] if qB(A)rAA + (1− qB(A))rAB − qB(B)rBA − (1− qB(B))rBB = 0
{0} if qB(A)rAA + (1− qB(A))rAB − qB(B)rBA − (1− qB(B))rBB > 0
The best response of S2 when the actual table is A and the sender 1 has sent message
A is given by:
qA(A) ∈


{1} if rAA − rAB > 0
[0, 1] if rAA − rAB = 0
{0} if rAA − rAB < 0
The best response of S2 when the actual table is A and the sender 1 has sent message
B is given by:
qA(B) ∈


{1} if rBA − rBB > 0
[0, 1] if rBA − rBB = 0
{0} if rBA − rBB < 0
The best response of S2 when the actual table is B and the sender 1 has sent message
A is given by:
qB(A) ∈


{1} if rAB − rAA > 0
[0, 1] if rAB − rAA = 0
{0} if rAB − rAA < 0
The best response of S2 when the actual table is B and the sender 1 has sent message
B is given by:
qB(B) ∈


{1} if rBB − rBA > 0
[0, 1] if rBB − rBA = 0
{0} if rBB − rBA < 0
The receiver’s best response after observing message ij ∈ {AA,AB,BA,BB} is
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given by:
rij ∈


{1} if µij <
1
2
[0, 1] if µij =
1
2
{0} if µij >
1
2
where the beliefs calculated by the Bayes’ rule (whenever possible) are as follows:
µAA =
pAqA(A)
pAqA(A) + pBqB(A)
, µBB =
(1− pA)(1− qA(B))
(1− pA)(1− qA(B)) + (1− pB)(1− qB(B))
µAB =
pA(1− qA(A))
pA(1− qA(A)) + pB(1− qB(A))
, µBA =
(1− pA)qA(B)
(1− pA)qA(B) + (1− pB)qB(B)
.
In the first step, we want to show that S1 uses the same strategy at the two
information sets. To do that, first, we are going to assume that S2 uses the same
strategies at her information sets, then we will allow for the case in which S2 may
use different strategies.
Case 1: Suppose that S2 uses the same strategy qA(A) = qB(A) and qA(B) = qB(B).
For a contradiction, without loss of generality, we assume that pA > pB.
Case 1.a: Assume that qA(A) = qB(A) ∈ (0, 1) and qA(B) = qB(B) ∈ (0, 1).
Then, the beliefs can be calculated as µAA >
1
2
, µAB >
1
2
, µBA <
1
2
, and µBB <
1
2
.
The associated best responses of the receiver are rAA = 0, rAB = 0, rBA = 1, and
rBB = 1. The best responses of S1 in turn become pA = 0 and pB = 1, which
contradicts to our hypothesis.
Case 1.b: Now, assume that qA(A) = qB(A) = 0 and qA(B) = qB(B) = 0.
Then, the beliefs become µBB <
1
2
and µAB >
1
2
. The best responses of the receiver
corresponding to these beliefs are rBB = 1 and rAB = 0. The best responses of S1 in
turn become pA = 0 and pB = 1, which again contradicts to our hypothesis pA > pB.
Case 1.c: Now, assume that qA(A) = qB(A) = 1 and qA(B) = qB(B) = 1.
Then, the beliefs become µBA <
1
2
and µAA >
1
2
. The best responses of the receiver
corresponding to these beliefs are rBA = 1 and rAA = 0. The best responses of S1 in
turn become pA = 0 and pB = 1, which gives the desired contradiction.
Case 1.d: We next assume that qA(A) = qB(A) = 0 and qA(B) = qB(B) ∈ (0, 1).
Then, the beliefs become µBB <
1
2
, µBA <
1
2
, and µAB >
1
2
. The best responses of
the receiver corresponding to these beliefs are rBB = 1, rBA = 1, and rAB = 0. The
best responses of S1 in turn become pA = 0 and pB = 1, which contradicts to our
hypothesis.
Case 1.e: We next assume that qA(A) = qB(A) = 0 and qA(B) = qB(B) = 1.
Then, the beliefs become µBA <
1
2
and µAB >
1
2
. The best responses of the receiver
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corresponding to these beliefs are rBA = 1 and rAB = 0. The best responses of S1 in
turn become pA = 0 and pB = 1, which contradicts to our hypothesis.
Case 1.f: We next assume that qA(A) = qB(A) = 1 and qA(B) = qB(B) ∈ (0, 1).
Then, the beliefs become µBB <
1
2
, µBA <
1
2
, and µAA >
1
2
. The best responses of the
receiver corresponding to these beliefs are rBB = 1, rBA = 1, and rAA = 0. The best
responses of S1 in turn become pA = 0 and pB = 1, which provides a contradiction.
Case 1.g: We next assume that qA(A) = qB(A) = 1 and qA(B) = qB(B) = 0.
Then, the beliefs become µAA >
1
2
and µBB <
1
2
. The best responses of the receiver
corresponding to these beliefs are rAA = 0 and rBB = 1. The best responses of S1
again become pA = 0 and pB = 1, which is a contradiction.
The other symmetric cases give the similar contradictions, and thus, are omitted.
Case 2: We now consider that case where S2 uses different strategies. Without loss
of generality, we assume that qA(A) > qB(A) ≥ 0 and qA(B) > qB(B) ≥ 0. Again,
suppose for a contradiction that pA > pB ≥ 0. Then, the beliefs are calculated as
µAA >
1
2
and µBB <
1
2
. The corresponding best responses of the receiver at these
information sets become rAA = 0 and rBB = 1. Note that for qA(A) > qB(A) and
qA(B) > qB(B) to be part of an equilibrium, the receiver’s strategies should satisfy
rAA ≥ rAB and rBA ≥ rBB. As rAA = 0 and rBB = 1, we get rAB = 0 and rBB = 1.
Then, the best response of S1 against the receiver’s strategies become pA = 0 and
pB = 1, which is the desired contradiction.
In the next step, we show that S2 must use the same strategy in equilibrium, i.e.
qA(A) = qB(A) = q1 and qA(B) = qB(B) = q2.
Case 1: We first assume that S1 uses the same strategy.
Case 1.a: Suppose that pA = pB ∈ (0, 1). Assume for a contradiction that
qA(A) > qB(A). This implies µAA >
1
2
and µAB <
1
2
. The best responses of the
receiver in turn becomes rAA = 0 and rAB = 1. The best responses of S2 against the
receiver’s strategy is qA(A) = 0 and qB(A) = 1, which contradicts to our hypothesis.
Case 1.b: Suppose that pA = pB = 0. Assume for a contradiction, qA(B) >
qB(B). This implies µBA >
1
2
and µBB <
1
2
. The best responses of the receiver in
turn becomes rBB = 1 and rBA = 0. The best responses of S2 against the receiver’s
strategy is qA(B) = 0 and qB(B) = 1, which contradicts to our hypothesis.
Case 1.c: Suppose that pA = pB = 1. Assume for a contradiction, qA(A) > qB(A).
This implies µAA >
1
2
and µAB <
1
2
. The best responses of the receiver in turn
becomes rAA = 0 and rAB = 1. The best responses of S2 against the receiver’s
strategy is qB(A) = 1 and qA(A) = 0, which contradicts to our hypothesis.
All other symmetric cases give the desired results.
Case 2: We now assume that S1 uses different strategies; and without loss of
generality assume pA > pB ≥ 0. To arrive at a contradiction, without loss of
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generality, we assume that qA(A) > qB(A) and qA(B) > qB(B). The beliefs can be
calculated as µAA >
1
2
and µBB <
1
2
. The best responses of the receiver in turn
becomes rAA = 0 and rBB = 1. For qA(A) > qB(A) and qA(B) > qB(B) to be a part
of equilibrium, the receiver’s equilibrium strategies should satisfy rAA ≥ rAB and
rBA ≥ rBB. As rAA = 0 and rBB = 1, we get rAB = 0 and rBA = 1. Against these
strategies of the receiver, the best responses of S1 satisfy pA = 0 and pB = 1, which
contradicts to the hypothesis. 
Proof of Proposition 3. For sender 1 the expected payoff of choosing truth is as
follows:
E[u1(truth)] = σ2 [σ
n
R0.5 + (1− σ
n
R)4.5] + (1− σ2) [σ
c
R0.5 + (1− σ
c
R)4.5] .
Similarly, expected payoff of choosing lie is:
E[u1(lie)] = σ2 [σ
c
R4.5 + (1− σ
c
R)0.5] + (1− σ2) [σ
n
R4.5 + (1− σ
n
R)0.5]− c1.
Then, σ1 =
1
1+e
γ[4(σn
R
+σc
R
−1)−c1]
.
Sender 2’s expected payoff of choosing truth is:
E[u2(truth)] = σ1 [σ
n
R0.5 + (1− σ
n
R)4.5] + (1− σ1) [σ
c
R4.5 + (1− σ
c
R)0.5] .
Similarly, sender 2’s expected payoff by choosing lie is:
E[u2(lie)] = σ1 [σ
c
R0.5 + (1− σ
c
R)4.5] + (1− σ1) [σ
n
R4.5 + (1− σ
n
R)0.5]− c2.
So, σ2 =
1
1+e
γ[4(σn
R
−σc
R
)−c2]
. Next, we find the expected payoff of a receiver who has
observed the same -nonconflicting- messages sent by the two senders and trusts to
sender 1.
E[uR(trust to S1)] = 9σ1σ2 + (1− σ1)(1− σ2).
Similarly, the expected payoff of a receiver who distrusts to sender 1 upon seeing
nonconflicting messages is given by:
E[uR(distrust to S1)] = σ1σ2 + 9(1− σ1)(1− σ2).
We can conclude that σnR =
1
1+eγ[8(1−σ1−σ2)]
. The expected payoff of a receiver who
trusts to sender 1 upon observing conflicting messages can be given as:
E[uR(trust to S1)] = 9σ1(1− σ2) + (1− σ1)σ2.
The expected payoff of a receiver who distrusts to sender 1 upon observing conflicting
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messages is:
E[uR(distrust to S1)] = σ1(1− σ2) + 9(1− σ1)σ2.
Finally, σcR =
1
1+eγ[8(σ2−σ1)]
.
The uniqueness is ensured by ∂σ1
∂σc
R
< 0, ∂σ1
∂σn
R
< 0 and
∂σcR
∂σ1
> 0,
∂σnR
∂σ1
> 0;
∂σ2
∂σn
R
< 0, ∂σ2
∂σc
R
> 0 and
∂σnR
∂σ2
> 0,
∂σcR
∂σ2
< 0. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Expected utility of sender 1 by being truthful is as
follows:
E[u1(truth)] = σ
t
2 [σ
n
R0.5 + (1− σ
n
R)4.5] + (1− σ
t
2) [σ
c
R0.5 + (1− σ
c
R)4.5] .
Similarly, expected payoff of choosing to lie is:
E[u1(lie)] = σ
l
2 [σ
c
R4.5 + (1− σ
c
R)0.5] + (1− σ
l
2) [σ
n
R4.5 + (1− σ
n
R)0.5]− c1.
Thus, we get σ1. Then, we derive the expected payoff of sender 2 by telling the truth
after observing a truthful message of sender 1.
E[u2(truth)] = σ
n
R0.5 + (1− σ
n
R)4.5.
Similarly, sender 2’s expected payoff by choosing lie after observing a truthful message
is:
E[u2(lie)] = σ
c
R0.5 + (1− σ
c
R)4.5− c
t
2.
So, we get that σt2. Next, we find the expected payoff of sender 2 by telling the truth
after observing an untruthful message of sender 1.
E[u2(truth)] = σ
c
R4.5 + (1− σ
c
R)0.5.
Similarly, sender 2’s expected payoff by choosing lie after observing an untruthful
message is:
E[u2(lie)] = σ
n
R4.5 + (1− σ
n
R)0.5− c
l
2.
Thus, we arrive at σl2. Now, we find the expected payoff of a receiver who trusts to
sender 1 after observing nonconflicting messages:
E[uR(trust to S1)] = 9σ1σ
t
2 + (1− σ1)(1− σ
l
2).
Similarly, the expected payoff of a receiver who distrusts to sender 1 upon seeing
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nonconflicting messages is given by:
E[uR(distrust to S1)] = σ1σ
t
2 + 9(1− σ1)(1− σ
l
2).
And, we get that σnR equals to the expression in the proposition. Finally, we calculate
the expected payoff of a receiver who trusts to sender 1 upon observing conflicting
messages.
E[uR(trust to S1)] = 9σ1(1− σ
t
2) + (1− σ1)σ
l
2.
The expected payoff of a receiver who distrusts to sender 1 upon observing conflicting
messages is:
E[uR(distrust to S1)] = σ1(1− σ
t
2) + 9(1− σ1)σ
l
2.
Then, we find that σcR.
The uniqueness is ensured by ∂σ1
∂σc
R
< 0, ∂σ1
∂σn
R
< 0 and
∂σcR
∂σ1
> 0,
∂σnR
∂σ1
> 0;
∂σt2
∂σn
R
<
0,
∂σt2
∂σc
R
> 0 and
∂σnR
∂σt2
> 0,
∂σcR
∂σt2
< 0; and
∂σl2
∂σn
R
< 0,
∂σl2
∂σc
R
> 0 and
∂σnR
∂σl2
> 0,
∂σcR
∂σl2
< 0. 
38
